Third World Development: Foreign Aid or Free Trade?
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| by John Majewski |
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Third World poverty is one of the most pressing problems
of our age, condemning billions of people to lives of hardship
and misery. Such poverty has led many Americans to want to
help Third World peoples, both for humanitarian reasons and to
increase our own trade and national security.
In response to Third World poverty, the U.S. government
has provided over $321 billion in assistance since World War
II.[1] As this figure indicates, foreign aid is politically
popular. Besides its humanitarian supporters, many special
interest groups lobby for foreign aid. For example, American
farmers back food assistance because such programs help
eliminate politically embarrassing food surpluses caused by
agricultural subsidies.[2]
While foreign aid is a political success, it is an
economic and social failure. By increasing government power,
destroying economic incentives, promoting unprofitable
enterprises, and subsidizing misguided policies, foreign aid
increases Third World poverty. In this essay we will examine
two types of foreign aid: humanitarian and development
assistance. We will then discuss alternatives to aid in
helping the Third World, especially the policy of free trade.
Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian assistance -- aid designed to avert
immediate disaster -- mainly takes the form of food aid that
is allocated through Public Law 480, widely known as the Food
for Peace program. Since the establishment of FFP in 1954,
the United States has distributed some $34 billion worth of
food to the Third World, and currently provides some $1.2
billion a year in food transfers.[3] Although it reduces the
surpluses of our government farm programs, Food for Peace has
actually increased hunger abroad in the long run.
One problem with food aid is that the dumping of free
food in Third World countries depresses prices for local
farmers, therefore resulting in less domestic production.
According to George Dunlop, chief of staff of the Senate
Agricultural Committee, millions of Indians may have died of
starvation because American wheat dumped in India bankrupted
thousands of Indian farmers.[4] Thousands of Guatemalan farmers
were likewise hurt when food aid poured into the country after
the 1976 earthquake. For these unfortunate farmers, "the
price of domestic crops dropped at a time when farmers
desperately needed cash to improve and repair their
homes...."[5] In Bangladesh, the upper and middle classes
receive free food from foreign aid programs, thus
impoverishing local farmers with artificially low prices.[6]
A second major problem with food aid is that it
encourages the recipient nations to adopt policies that
discourage production. With food aid to "cover-up" the most
grievous results of their actions, Third World governments can
pursue such counter-productive policies as forced
collectivization and price controls on farm products. For
example, Tanzanian President Nyerere was able to collectivize
farms and engage in massive relocations of peasants because
food aid "hid" the consequences of such actions.[7] In many
cases, such as in Bangladesh, food aid leads to the neglect of
agricultural production because of the belief that other
nations will provide sufficient amounts of free food:
Bangladesh officials are convinced that the
international donors will not allow them to starve.
Since it is easier to order a shipment of food through
the embassy in Washington than to spend time and money
on a domestic procurement program, a definite
complacency has settled over the bureaucracy. The
technocrats who dominate the powerful ministries of
finance, planning and food are resigned to continued
reliance on American, Canadian, and Australian surpluses
of food grains. One symptom of the relief mentality
is a reluctance to invest too much of the country's
limited resources away from the more glamorous
industrial sector and into low profile agricultural
projects.[8]
The end result of programs such as Food for Peace is a
complete dependence on food aid for many countries. Food aid
destroys Third World food production, creating a perpetual
crisis that requires more aid to avoid famine. The cycle
continues until the country is completely dependent upon free
food from abroad. As one analyst put it, foreign aid has
become "the opiate of the Third World" that keeps the less
developed countries (LDCs) permanently dependent on the West
for their very existence.[9]
A third consequence of government-to-government food aid
is the destruction of more efficient private efforts. Before
World War II, private charities provided hundreds of millions
of dollars in emergency aid. Because private food aid is
administered directly to the poor -- it is an exchange between
individuals, not governments -- it does not destroy markets
through indiscriminate dumping or lead to destructive farm
policies. Government food aid hinders private efforts by
limiting the feeling of moral responsibility among citizens of
more wealthy nations. Even more important, government food
aid has "politicized" many private organizations by providing
the bulk of their budgets, therefore destroying their
incentives to be efficient. Without private alternatives,
Third World nations are quick to accept public aid that
increases the likelihood of future food shortages.[10]
Development Aid
Development aid attempts to promote long-run growth of
the LDCs by building large projects, giving budgetary and
balance of payments help, and funding a variety of research
and planning efforts. Since 1946 the United States has given
over $131 billion in development assistance.[11] Despite the
scale of these international transfers, they have not led to
sustained growth. Rather, aid has significantly impaired LDC
progress by expanding the role of the public sector in the
recipient nations.
Development aid is based on the premise that Third World
nations don't grow because they lack of financial resources.
But financial resources have relatively little impact on
growth rates when compared to other factors. As P. T. Bauer
argues, "Economic achievement depends on personal, cultural,
social and political factors, that is people's own faculties,
motivations and mores, their institutions and the policies of
their rulers."[12] Even if financial resources were vital to
growth, the Third World does not lack the means of obtaining
international credit. If anything, the more than $800 billion
total debt accumulated by LDCs shows that they may have had
too much financial capital, rather than too little.[13]
As with food aid, development assistance politicizes
Third World economic life. Aid helps incumbents expand their
power through political patronage. According to economist
Doug Bandow, "The tendency of ruling groups, particularly in
societies where political power is so important, is to use
aid, or funds released by aid, to strengthen their own
position, reward their supporters, and buy off or crush
opposition movements."[14] By limiting political competition,
foreign aid inhibits the implementation of badly needed
market-oriented reforms.
Even aid that is not used for overt political repression
leads to the growth of large, unproductive bureaucracies.
According to a recent Agency for International Development
report: "Many African institutions officially responsible for
planning and implementing development are saturated with
development assistance, paralyzed by administrative
inefficiency, staggering beneath a burden of complex and
differing donor requirements, and are themselves in danger of
becoming obstacles to development."[15] Some countries that
receive large amounts of development aid, such as Zambia, use
over 20 per cent of their GNP to provide civil service
employees with a standard of living which is "totally out of
synch with the rest of the economy."[16]
Through these large bureaucracies, development aid
fosters political exploitation. There are many examples of
Third World governments using aid to enrich the ruling elite
at the expense of the masses. President Sese Seko of Zaire,
for instance, used foreign aid money to partly fund the
construction of eleven presidential palaces.[17] Foreign aid is
also used to build expensive capital cities, such as Brasilia,
Islamabad, Abuja in Nigeria, Lilongwe in Malawi, and Dodoma in
Tanzania, that benefit few people except the ruling classes.[18]
In some of the poorest parts of Africa, government officials
are known as "Wabenzi" -- men of the Mercedes-Benz.[19] Foreign
aid is also used to subsidize expensive Third World airlines.
These airlines benefit only the elite of the country, while
taking away resources from needed private sector activities.[20]
Even if development aid didn't lead to political
exploitation, it would still foster economic inefficiency.
Unlike firms in the private sector, government projects are
not subjected to the discipline of profit and loss accounting.
Because they operate outside the market, government projects
-- the kind financed by foreign aid -- have low or negative
rates of return. In many cases, aid agencies explicitly
undertake such projects because the private sector refuses to
finance them. Foreign aid thus channels the recipient
nation's resources into unproductive areas of investment:
The broadest ill effect of development assistance is
that it distorts market signals and incentives. It
therefore diverts economic resources from their most
productive uses in developing nations. Whenever
resources are made available outside of normal market
channels, buyers and sellers in related market
activities receive inappropriate signals and change
their behavior, reducing locally generated incomes. The
resulting distortions may be major or minor, but they
always occur.[21]
Without the price system to guide them, Third World
nations have attempted to develop by simply building the same
type of enterprises that flourish in more advanced countries.
Steel plants, aluminum factories, and oil refineries funded
with aid money dot the Third World, despite the fact that the
markets for these products are already saturated. Because
they cannot hope to compete with more established firms, these
aid projects drain skilled labor and other resources away from
the private sector with no corresponding benefits.[22]
Foreign aid not only wastes scarce resources in the very
nations which can least afford waste, it also creates
international tensions. Foreign aid has united the
governments of the Third World into a cohesive unit that has
but one goal: secure more aid. To accomplish this, the Third
World has found that the politics of confrontation work best.
In their eyes, the world is divided between rich and poor,
with the former having an obligation to help the latter. The
result is international conflict:
The West has created an entity hostile to itself -- this
is the biggest and most intriguing of the many anomalies
of aid. Individual Third World countries are often
neutral or even friendly to the West, but the organized
and articulate Third World is at best critical and more
often hostile. The purpose of the Third World qua
collectivity is to coax or extract money from the
West.[23]
Finally, we must note that development aid significantly
drains our own resources. Many people support foreign aid
because of the perception that it helps our export industries.
In fact, there are stipulations on most aid packages requiring
the use of American goods whenever possible. Because foreign
aid subsidizes American companies which deal with the Third
World, it shifts assets from more efficient firms, thereby
reducing our overall economic performance. Supporting aid in
the hope that some of it might be spent in the United States
is like a supermarket giving money away in the hope that
consumers will spend part of it in the store -- there is
always a net loss.[24]
Another Way?
The basic problem with both types of foreign aid is that
they strengthen the institutions which prevent progress while
weakening the institutions of the Third World which could
bring true prosperity. Aid increases the role of government
and bureaucracy in the economic life of the Third World, while
it minimizes the role of markets and private entrepreneurship.
If we are to help developing nations prosper, we must find a
method that creates a bigger role for institutions such as the
market.
One way of aiding Third World nations is through free
trade. By lowering our import barriers, we can allow the
private sectors of the Third World easier access to our
markets. With the huge markets of the United States available
for their products, entrepreneurs will have the opportunity to
develop new industries or expand old ones. As Lord Bauer
writes, removing protectionist barriers will allow more Third
World countries to experience the success of such Pacific
Basin countries as Hong Kong and Singapore:
As for economic development, the West can best promote
this by the reduction of its often severe barriers to
imports from poor countries. External commerce is an
effective stimulus to economic progress. It is
commercial intercourse with the West which has
transformed economic life in the Far East, South-East
Asia, and parts of Africa and Latin America.[25]
Free trade also has the advantage of helping our own
economy. While this is no place to explode the numerous
protectionist fallacies, free trade will increase our wealth
with a great influx of goods and services from abroad. Like
all voluntary exchanges, international trade is a positive sum
activity; both America and the Third World benefit from it.
Even if we make the heroic assumption that foreign aid
actually helps Third World countries, it would still be only a
zero sum activity; it can only help the recipient nation by
hurting the donor nation.
Conclusion
Foreign aid fails as a development policy because it
destroys the incentives of the marketplace and extends the
power of ruling elites. Because it leads the Third World away
from the free market, it actually increases Third World
poverty. On the other hand, the alternative policy of free
trade will give the private sector of the LDCs an opportunity
to expand and flourish.
It must be emphasized that free trade alone will not
solve all the problems of Third World poverty. Free trade
only increases the opportunities of the less developed
nations. It will not eliminate the shackles of government
regulation and intervention that dominate Third World
economies. That task can only be done by the people of the
Third World themselves. Yet, eliminating foreign aid and
instituting free trade will at least encourage Third World
peoples to develop institutions such as private property
rights and free markets which will lead to growth and
prosperity.
- Doug Bandow, "The U.S. Role in Promoting Third World
Development," in Doug Bandow, ed., U.S. Aid to the Developing
World: A Free Market Agenda (Washington: The Heritage
Foundation, 1985), p. ix.
- Daniel A. Sumner and Edward W. Erickson, "The Theory and
Practice of Development Aid" in Bandow, op. cit., p. 57.
- Bandow, op. cit., p. xiii; Budget of the United States
Government: Fiscal Year 1987, p.5-20.
- James Bovard, "The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid,"
Cato Policy Analysis, January 31, 1986, p. 4.
- Mark Huber, "Humanitarian Aid," in Bandow, op. cit., p. 7.
- Stephan De Vylder, Agriculture in Chains (London: Zed
Press, 1982), p. 46.
- P. T. Bauer, Reality and Rhetoric: Studies in the
Economics of Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1984), p. 52.
- Stephan De Vylder, op. cit., p. 47.
- Bovard, op. cit., p. 2.
- Arthur E. Farnsley, II, "Humanitarian Aid in the Twentieth
Century: Public and Private" in Bandow, op. cit., pp. 13-24.
- Bandow, op. cit., p. xi.
- Bauer, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
- Bandow, op. cit., p. xvii.
- Ibid., p. xx.
- Bovard, op. cit., p. 11.
- Ibid., p. 12.
- Ibid., p. 19.
- Bauer, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
- Bovard, op. cit., p. 19.
- Bauer, op. cit., p. 51.
- Summer and Erickson, op. cit., p. 57.
- Bandow, op. cit., p. xix.
- Bauer, op. cit., p. 41.
- Ibid., pp. 54-55.
- Ibid., p. 62.