Privatize Deposit Insurance
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| by Jeffrey Rogers Hummel |
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Amidst all the groping and furor over the savings and
loan crisis, no public official has pointed a finger at the
ultimate culprit. The Bush Administration admits that the
nation's ailing S & L industry will cost the government at
least $90 billion. That would be the most expensive bailout
in U.S. history -- bigger than those for Lockheed, Chrysler,
New York City, and Western Europe (through the Marshall Plan)
combined, even after adjusting for inflation. But contrary to
popular perceptions, the crisis stems not from too little
regulation, but too much. It all can be traced to the
perverse influence of government deposit insurance.
The federal government first insured deposits in reaction
to the Great Depression. A scramble for currency among
depositors had led to runs on nearly 10,000 banks. This
liquidity crunch forced otherwise solvent institutions into
emergency sales of their assets. Unnecessary bank failures, a
one-third collapse in the money supply, and deflation were the
result. To protect the economy from future panics, the newly
established Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
guaranteed small depositors against any losses.
Comparisons with other countries now suggest that the
regulations already existing in the 1920s were responsible for
the precariousness of the American banking system. Canada,
for example, permitted its commercial banks to open branches
nationwide and had yet to set up a central bank. Not one
Canadian bank failed during the Great Depression.
However plausible the justification of deposit insurance
for U.S. commercial banks, it certainly did not apply to
savings and loan associations. Unlike banks, S & L's at that
time didn't offer checking accounts or any other deposit that
served as a medium of exchange, nor were they plagued by runs.
Yet S & L's got similar guarantees with the establishment of
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) in
1934.
Government deposit insurance may have dampened the danger
of bank runs, but only at the cost of incurring another
danger. Private insurance companies have long been aware of
what is called "moral hazard." If you protect someone from
the painful consequences of risk, he will have less incentive
to avoid risky actions. Insurance against fire or automobile
accidents thus can be so complete that it fosters carelessness
and leads to more fires and accidents.
One way insurance companies get around the moral-hazard
problem is with a deductible, which makes the insured bear
some of the cost of risky actions. Private insurance
companies also vary premiums according to actual risks;
otherwise they lose money. Government deposit insurance, in
contrast, ignores these sound principles. It therefore
subsidizes risk-taking by depository institutions. They pay
the same premium regardless, and their depositors have no
financial reason to impose market discipline by doing business
elsewhere.
Not until the 1980s, however, did this moral-hazard time
bomb explode. Pervasive government regulation protected banks
and S & L's from competition while simultaneously restricting
their portfolios to safe assets. Only after the inflation and
climbing interest rates of the 1970s required these
institutions to bid actively for deposits did the government
initiate financial deregulation. Unfortunately, deregulation
did not go far enough. By leaving deposit insurance untouched
(except to raise coverage), it rewarded the managers of banks
and S & L's who gambled with their depositors' money. All the
colorful headlines about cowboy bankers and corporate
swindlers overlook the way that the regulatory environment
distorts the normal market curbs against such behavior.
Government favoritism for insolvent banks and S & L's
aggravates the crisis. If the FDIC and FSLIC were truly
interested in protecting the small depositor, they would close
insolvent institutions and pay off the depositors directly.
Instead, they usually arrange purchase and assumption
agreements that merge failed institutions with healthy ones.
Big depositors are protected as well as small in a short-term
solution that merely compounds long-term difficulties.
The crisis has reached such epic proportions among S &
L's that the FSLIC no longer has enough resources even to
arrange bailout mergers. Growing numbers of bankrupt
institutions continue to compete with sound S & L's, driving
the interest paid to depositors still higher. Genie Short and
Jeffrey Gunther of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas point
out in a recent study that "such policies penalize the more
conservatively-managed institutions over the more aggressive
ones."
Indeed, no regulatory sleight of hand can magically
transform bad loans into good. Without enough income from
these loans, the failed but still operating "zombie"
institutions can pay interest to their current depositors only
with money from new depositors. The regulators thereby
sanction an escalating chain letter that makes the final
accounting ever more expensive. When they take over an S & L
themselves, the regulators still are powerless to do anything
else without outside funds.
None of the Administration's proposals address the root
cause. Attempting to re-regulate the S & L industry by
imposing, for instance, higher capital requirements, will
simply destroy it. Market forces already are unleashed. The
competitive survival of banks and S & L's compelled financial
deregulation. The regulatory haven that gave banks and S &
L's a tidy market-sharing arrangement cannot be reconstructed.
If Congress increases insurance premiums, the sound
institutions will be the ones to pay. This will further
punish the very kind of management that should be encouraged.
Nor can government ever adequately administer variable
premiums. "A rational system of risk-based insurance premiums
offered monopolistically by a public agency is simply
impossible," argues Gerald O'Driscoll of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas. Without the feedback of profit and loss,
bureaucrats have neither the information nor the incentive for
matching premiums to risk.
And foisting the cleanup bill on the taxpayer is not
merely unjust but also tempts politicians and bureaucrats to
try the same scam again. How much longer will the taxpayer be
expected to cough up the cash for the government's selfserving
and disingenuous pledges? How much higher will the
price tag have to soar? Unfortunately, some undeserving group
must take the hit for the irretrievable S & L losses, but the
depositors at least voluntarily assumed a risk when they
accepted fabulous political promises at face value. If the
depositors want compensation, let them turn not to the muchabused
and long-suffering taxpayer but to the managers of the
failed S & L's, perhaps to the sale of government assets, and
ultimately to the personal liability of the politicians and
bureaucrats who perpetrated this outrage.
Only one solution can overcome moral hazards in the
banking and thrift industries: private deposit insurance. The
government must dissolve the FDIC and FSLIC and remove all
remaining regulations upon depository institutions. The first
step would permit the competitive forces of the market to
arrange actuarially sound insurance that protects depositors
without subsidizing insolvency. The second step would help
depository institutions gain the geographical and asset
diversity necessary to shore up liquidity during runs.
The S & L crisis is just the tip of the moral-hazard
iceberg. Although not yet visible, deposit insurance creates
the same perverse incentives for commercial banks. The FDIC
already rates 10 percent of these institutions in the problem
bank category, within an industry with $2 trillion worth of
deposits. Unless deregulation proceeds to the privatization
of deposit insurance, the nation soon faces a larger crisis
throughout the banking industry.
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel is Publications Director for the
Independent Institute in San Francisco.