TIME AND PUBLIC POLICY
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| by by T. Alexander Smith
University of Tennessee Press, P.O. Box 250, Ithaca, NY 14850
1988 299 pages $29.95 cloth
Reviewed by Israel M. Kirzner
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T. Alexander Smith, a professor of political science at
the University of Tennessee, has written an impressive book.
disciplines, particularly economics, sociology, and politics
-- but also involves psychology, philosophy, and history.
This review is written from the narrow perspective of an
"Austrian" economist (whose objectivity is, it must be
confessed, perhaps compromised in the book's favor by its
author's embrace of the Austrian tradition in economics, and
by his general endorsement of free market policies.)
The major thesis of the book can be stated simply.
Modern societies, partly as a result of various sociological
forces, partly as a result of welfare state policies and
majoritarian "promissory politics," are systematically biassed
toward the short run: "Our time horizons have changed
radically in the modern era." This bias, the author claims,
poses a serious danger for society's long run health and
viability. Where we ought to be pursuing courses of action
that recognize the long run benefits of bourgeois values,
frugality, thrift, and self-restraint, there in fact are
powerful political and social forces that lead us, as voters
and as politicians, to place greater emphasis on short run,
fleeting, and ephemeral benefits. What is required, Smith
maintains, is a pattern of institutional reform that will
encourage long range planning, and the willingness to forgo
instant gratification for the sake of future goals.
This thesis is developed in eight chapters of wellwritten
prose enriched by a scholarly apparatus modestly
concealed in the endnotes, reflecting an extraordinarily wide
range of reading and study. Although this reviewer has
several quibbles to express as an economist, as a citizen he
finds the overall thrust of the book -- especially in its
development of themes in sociology and politics -- highly
persuasive and important. Although at least some economic
aspects of Smith's argument have been developed before (for
example, Henry Hazlitt's classic Economics in One Lesson
critique of interventionism is based on the insight that the
"art of economics consists in looking not merely at the
immediate but at the longer effects of any act or
policy...."), the book's reinforcement of its economic
insights by reference to sociology, and to political
institutions, adds up to an innovative and powerful case for
the free market and the rule of law.
My quibbles will at first seem minor ones, yet on
reflection they turn out to be quite disturbing to the
economist. The economist who appreciates the social
usefulness of free markets, and also understands the
importance of the time profiles of production and consumption,
will argue that a key virtue of the market economy is that it
stimulates economic growth to reflect, with reasonable
faithfulness, the wishes of the individual market
participants. In other words, the market generates volumes
and rates of capital accumulation and depreciation which
reflect the time preferences of the citizens in their
capacities of consumers and potential investors. Smith's
position seems, if I read him correctly, to argue for the free
market economy because it is likely to generate a time profile
of savings, capital-using production, and consumption which is
faithful to what (in Smith's judgment) is the "correct"
allocation between present and future. Smith sees the economy
as sliding into a miasma of instant gratification -- at a time
when it ought to be planning prudently for capital replacement
and long term growth. One would like to think that Smith's
view of the "correct' allocation over time expresses what he
believes to be the true wishes of the public. Yet certain
parts of the book -- notably chapter 2, where the author notes
and deplores the modern abandonment of bourgeois values --
suggest that he really does hope for a set of institutions
which will not permit citizens to exercise their unhealthily
high time preferences. This way of thinking may be eminently
defensible from a variety of perspectives, but the economist
(who sees the virtue of markets to lie in their respect for
citizens' preferences, no matter how degenerate and "wrong"
they may be) feels uncomfortable with it.
This discomfort is only deepened by our noticing that
Smith, throughout the book, deplores the sacrifice of the
future for the present -- never recognizing, it would appear,
that beyond some point, surely, additional provision for the
future may be entirely too costly for a present generation.
Surely Smith does not wish us to postpone all present
consumption to the future? Which future? Next year, next
century, next millennium? Granted that our present
institutions have biassed us so strongly in the direction of
instant gratification that our immediate social and political
agenda may be usefully focused upon urging greater attention
to the future. Nonetheless, one would have expected some
mention of the free market's capacity to avoid, not only a
time profile tilted too much toward the present, but also one
tilted too much toward the future. What the Austrian emphasis
on time allocation depends on, is not so much any admiration
for the bourgeois virtues of frugality and thrift per se, as
an understanding of the need for thrift in order to achieve
preferred future consumption goals. This aspect of Austrian
understanding does not emerge unobscured in Smith's
book.
Related to this complaint must be a certain unease which
an Austrian economist feels at Smith's lengthy (and generally
sound) discussion of Say's Law in chapter 7. One comes away
from this chapter with the impression that Smith wishes us to
see Say's Law as teaching the primacy of production over
consumption, of supply over demand. But our appreciation for
the profoundly valid insights embodied in Say's Law should
surely not (at any rate not for Austrian economists!) take us
in that direction. To recognize that general overproduction
is, in the proper sense, impossible, does not require us to
say that "supply is the driving force behind 'demand'" -- for
Austrians the reverse, properly interpreted, is closer to the
truth. Keynes' error was, for Austrians, not his emphasis on
demand, but his belief that "aggregate demand" can be
deficient in equilibrium. For Austrians an appreciation for
the need to save is not based on any virtue of abstinence, but
on the desire to consume, more extensively, in the future.
Several further related quibbles: Smith has learnt his
Austrian economics well, and with a great deal of depth. Yet
he appears not to see that much of his thesis does not really
depend on Austrian insights. To be sure, his superb chapter 3
represents classic Austrian and Rothbardian deployment of a
Crusoe example to illustrate the meaning and importance of the
time profile of production and consumption activities. But
one does not have to be an Austrian to appreciate the
importance of planning and saving for the future. Certainly
one does not have to have a sophisticated Misesian
appreciation for the a priori quality of positive time
preference to accept Smith's thesis. By over-emphasizing the
Austrian route by which he apparently arrived at his
understanding of the importance of the time dimension, Smith
may have unnecessarily limited its potential significance for
economists following different approaches. (This Austrian
economist mentions this point somewhat diffidently: it must
seem loutish to sniff at Smith's appreciation for Austrian
economics -- so frequently ignored!)
Nor, one may respectfully submit, is the Austrian
economist's appreciation for the subtleties and complexities
of time quite captured by Smith's treatment of it. Although
Smith makes occasional mention of the problems of uncertainty
and knowledge introduced by the circumstance that human action
occurs in irreversible time, the overall thrust of his book
emphasizes only the one dimension: the need to allocate scarce
resources between the present and the future. Primordially
important though this dimension certainly is, it is a little
unfortunate that the book somehow conveys the impression that,
by developing its central thesis, the place of time in
economic policy has been fully and completely dealt with. For
Austrians, surely, far more needs to be discussed and
explained, including especially the role of competitive
processes, the role of entrepreneurial discovery, and the
complications these introduce into propositions concerning the
effectiveness of markets.
But these are mere economist's quibbles. The larger
picture presented by the book relies heavily on insights
concerning sociology and politics which impressed this lay
reader greatly. Smith has undoubtedly put his finer on a
central weakness of modern political systems. There can be no
question that the future economic and political well-being of
society depends significantly on our being able to disentangle
ourselves from the web of forces which, as Smith brilliantly
shows, distort our focus, mistakenly and tragically, toward
the present and immediate future. Smith's book deserves a
wide readership and careful thought and discussion.
Dr. Kirzner is a professor of economics at New York
University.