The Revolving Door Is the Policy: Big Tech and Its Regulators

Social Media Censorship, Part 12

Demi Pietchell
Demi Pietchell
PUBLISHED IN Digital Sovereignty - Nov 22, 2026
The Revolving Door Is the Policy: Big Tech and Its Regulators

AI-generated image

Someone Regulated Your Platform. They Used to Work There.

Ask most people why the platforms described throughout this series can suppress your reach, harvest your data, and freeze your accounts without meaningful oversight, and you will get some version of the same answer: “The regulators must not be doing their jobs.” This framing assumes an adversarial relationship between the regulators and the regulated, two sides with opposing interests, one of them failing to hold the line.

That framing gets the picture wrong. In a documented and repeated pattern, the regulators and the industry are often the same people at different points in their career, moving back and forth through a door that never quite closes behind them.

In the earlier pieces in this series (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11), we explored the mechanisms of suppression at the platform, search, and contractual levels. This installment looks at the layer underneath all of it: the specific individuals who wrote or approved the rules governing those mechanisms, and where those individuals worked before and after their time in government.

What the Revolving Door Actually Is

The revolving door describes the movement of individuals between regulatory or legislative positions and the industries those positions oversee. It shows up in two directions.

Both of them matter.

Industry professionals take government roles overseeing their former employers, bringing industry perspective and industry relationships into the regulatory process. Regulators leave government service for lucrative positions at the companies they recently oversaw—a pattern that creates an incentive, whether consciously acted on or not, to treat future employers gently during one's regulatory tenure.

Neither direction is illegal. Cooling-off periods exist in most jurisdictions, typically requiring a period of one to two years before a former official can lobby their previous agency directly. These periods are narrow, apply only to direct lobbying rather than advisory or strategic roles, and are frequently criticized by watchdog organizations as insufficient given how long institutional relationships and inside knowledge can actually persist.

Documented Cases at the Federal Trade Commission

The FTC is the primary federal agency responsible for enforcing consumer protection and competition law against major technology platforms, which makes its staffing pattern directly relevant to every mechanism described in this series.

Multiple FTC commissioners and senior staff across the past two decades have held positions at major law firms whose client rosters include the exact companies the FTC was actively investigating or had recently investigated. This is a matter of public record, based on financial disclosure forms filed with the Office of Government Ethics and cross-referenced with law firm client lists and lobbying registration databases maintained separately by the Senate and House.

The pattern is not confined to any single political administration. Commissioners appointed under different presidents, from different parties, have shown the same career trajectory: government service bookended by private-sector work either advising or directly representing the companies later subject to that same commissioner's regulatory authority. The consistency across administrations is informative in itself. This is a structural feature of how technology policy expertise concentrates, not a partisan talking point about any specific administration.

I went looking for the exception, half expecting to find one. I did not find one. Every administration I checked exhibited the same pattern, which told me more than any single case study could have.

The Federal Communications Commission

The FCC oversees telecommunications policy, including net neutrality rules, spectrum allocation, and increasingly the regulatory boundary questions around platform content moderation. Its staffing pattern mirrors the FTC's. Former telecom and technology industry executives have held commissioner and chairman positions, and multiple FCC officials have moved directly into senior roles at the companies whose regulatory environment they had recently overseen.

One particularly interesting pattern: Policy advisors who draft the technical language of proposed regulations frequently move from industry-funded think tanks into government roles, then back to industry-funded think tanks or directly to industry government-relations departments after their government tenure ends. The think tank functions as a kind of holding pattern on both ends of government service, and the specific funding sources of these think tanks are disclosed technically (as with the fact-checking organizations covered in Part 10 of this series) but rarely mentioned in coverage of the individual's career.

Congressional Staff

Legislative staffers who draft the actual language of proposed technology legislation are frequently former industry lobbyists or become industry lobbyists shortly after leaving Capitol Hill. Congressional staff salaries are modest relative to private-sector technology and lobbying compensation, which creates an obvious economic incentive. Once one builds expertise and relationships in a government role, one is then able to monetize both in the private sector once the government position ends.

This matters especially for the legislation governing platform liability, most notably Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which shields platforms from liability for user-generated content while also permitting broad content-moderation discretion. The staffers who have worked on proposed modifications to this framework across multiple sessions of Congress have, in a number of documented cases, moved into or out of positions at the platforms whose liability protections they were drafting language to preserve, narrow, or expand.

Every mechanism covered in this series operates within a specific legal environment.

Reach suppression and shadowbanning operate under the discretion granted by terms of service that Section 230 protects from most forms of legal challenge.

Data harvesting operates under a patchwork of state privacy laws that federal privacy legislation, repeatedly proposed and repeatedly stalled, that industry-connected staffers have had a direct hand in drafting across multiple legislative sessions.

Financial deplatforming, covered in Part 9, operates under banking regulations shaped by officials who move between the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, and the financial institutions those bodies oversee. This happens with such regularity that it has its own dedicated watchdogs and tracking projects.

None of this requires a coordinated conspiracy to function. It only requires a specific and self-reinforcing career pattern, one in which expertise concentrates in a small community of people. Industry benefits from regulatory outcomes shaped by people who understand industry's interests intimately because they recently worked inside industry. Similarly, the version of “expertise” that gets hired into government roles is disproportionately the version industry itself has cultivated and funded through the think tank and advisory pipeline.

The Failure of Imagination: Why People Think This Is Fine

“Regulators need industry expertise to do their jobs well.” This is true, and it is also precisely the mechanism that makes the revolving door effective rather than incidental. The expertise a regulator actually needs to oversee a complex industry is largely available only from people who have worked inside that industry, which means the pool of qualified regulators and the pool of former or future industry employees are, structurally, close to the same pool.

“Why do we need regulators at all?” This is the more consistent version of the previous objection, and it deserves a straight answer. A regulatory body reliably staffed by the industry it oversees ends up rubber-stamping decisions that industry would have made on its own anyway, funded by taxpayers, wearing a badge of public trust it never earned. If the people writing the rules keep coming from the companies they regulate, the fix isn’t more or better regulation. The fix is to trust regulation less.

Here's where it gets complicated. Getting rid of the regulatory body does not get rid of the platforms, the payment processors, or the underlying incentives that created the revolving door in the first place. Take the regulator away entirely, and a private company still suppresses reach, still shadowbans accounts, still writes itself unlimited discretion into a contract you never read, for the exact same business reasons covered throughout this series. The regulator's role here was to stamp these behaviors as legitimate, not to invent them or even quell them.

The practical answer this series keeps arriving at applies here too. Waiting for a captured regulator to fix the very incentive that captured it is not a plan. Waiting for a company to regulate itself out of a business model it built specifically to dodge regulation is not a plan either. Building owned infrastructure, covered in Parts 6 and 8 of this series, is what you do instead of waiting on either one.

“This happens in every industry, not just tech.” Correct—the pattern is well documented in finance, pharmaceuticals, defense, energy, and other sectors. The universality of the pattern across sectors is a reason to take it seriously as a general feature of how regulatory capture functions, rather than treating each sector's version of it as an isolated coincidence.

What’s your political type?

Find out right now by taking The World’s Smallest Political Quiz.

Take the Political Quiz

“If someone did something illegal, they would be prosecuted.” Almost none of what this article describes is illegal. That is the point. The cooling-off periods are legal minimums, not maximums, and satisfying the legal minimum does not eliminate the influence a career built on relationships and inside knowledge continues to carry long after the technical waiting period ends.

“Public officials disclose their financial interests. The system is transparent.” Disclosure exists in databases that require active searching to access, cross-referencing to interpret, and specific expertise to contextualize. If you need a research project to find something, it isn’t transparent. It’s hidden in plain sight.

What You Can Do About It

Use OpenSecrets and the Center for Responsive Politics database to check the career history of any specific regulator or legislator whose decisions affect a platform or industry you care about. Both maintain searchable, free, well-documented databases tracking campaign contributions, lobbying registrations, and career movement between government and industry.

Check the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) revolving door database specifically, which is purpose-built to track this exact pattern across federal agencies. It is more specialized and more current on this specific issue than the general-purpose databases.

Read the financial disclosure forms directly for any official whose decisions materially affect your interests. These are public record, filed with the Office of Government Ethics, and searchable by name. They’re a slog. They’re also the best primary source you can get on an official’s financial ties.

Contact your representatives with specific documented examples rather than general complaints. A message citing a specific staffer's employment history, a specific commissioner's prior law firm clients, or a specific piece of legislation's drafting history carries more weight and is harder to dismiss with a form response than a general statement of concern about “big tech influence.”

Support state-level regulatory action where it has outpaced federal action. Several states have moved further and faster on data privacy, platform accountability, and algorithmic transparency than the federal government, partly because state-level regulatory bodies have a shallower, more visible revolving door due to their smaller size and lower compensation ceilings relative to federal roles. That advantage may prove temporary, but it has been a very real one in the current environment.

Support organizations doing revolving-door documentation and accountability journalism specifically, including POGO, the Revolving Door Project, and OpenSecrets. This kind of tracking work is unglamorous, expensive to sustain, and directly upstream of every other reform effort described in this series, because you cannot fix a mechanism you cannot see clearly.

The Door Was Never Actually Closed

A revolving door, by its basic mechanical design, does not close behind anyone. It keeps turning, and the same people keep passing through it in both directions. These people bring the same relationships and working assumptions about which outcomes are reasonable regardless of which side of the door they happen to be standing on at any given moment.

Understanding this does not require believing in a conspiracy. It requires reading the financial disclosure forms, checking the employment histories, and asking the specific and answerable question of who used to work where before they started writing the rules. The answer is public record. It has been public record the entire time. The door was never hidden. It was just rarely photographed while it was turning.

Share this article

Recommended Reading

The Fine Print Behind 'I Agree'
Digital Sovereignty

The Fine Print Behind 'I Agree'

You clicked “I Agree” in seconds. The contract may govern your content, data, disputes, and even whether your account survives. Here are the clauses worth reading.

10 min read

Who Really Controls Your Money?
Digital Sovereignty

Who Really Controls Your Money?

Digital money can still leave someone else holding the keys. Paul Puey asks a more basic question: who can stop you from using your own money?

13 min read

Who Funds the People Who Decide What Is True?
Digital Sovereignty

Who Funds the People Who Decide What Is True?

Fact-checkers became the internet's referees, with the power to influence what millions of people see. But who funds the referees? Following the money reveals relationships that deserve scrutiny of their own.

12 min read